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Article VI is perhaps the most ambiguous provision of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-prolif-
eration of Nuclear Weapons (NPT or hereinafter ‘the Treaty’). The provision requires all
states parties
to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation
of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on
a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control.
In spite of the resistance on the part of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to the inclusion
of a disarmament element in the NPT,1 Article VI was eventually incorporated in the final
text of the Treaty as a compromise between the NWS and the opposing positions of non-
nuclear weapon states (NNWS). Together with non-proliferation and the right to the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Article VI constitutes one of the three pillars of the NPT
and is an essential element of the ‘grand bargain’ on which the Treaty is founded.2
* Reader in International Law, University of Westminster, London, and member of the ILA Committee on
Nuclear Weapons, Non-proliferation and Contemporary International Law.
1 G. Nystuen & T. Graff Hugo, ‘The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’, in G. Nystuen, S. Casey-Maslen & A.
Golden Bersagel (Eds.), Nuclear Weapons under International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2014, p. 383; D.H. Joyner, ‘The Legal Meaning and Implications of Article VI of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty’, in Ibid., p. 399.
2 D.H. Joyner, Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, p.
32. A commentator has suggested that, while the text seems to give more importance to the non-proliferation
and peaceful uses of nuclear energy pillars, a constitutional approach to the interpretation that takes into
account the subsequent practice of the parties and the purposes of the treaty implies that equal weight should
be given also to the disarmament pillar (N. White, ‘Interpretation of Non-Proliferation Treaties’, in D.H.
Joyner & M. Roscini (Eds.), Non-Proliferation Law as a Special Regime, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2012, p. 113).
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The present chapter discusses certain problems related to Article VI in the light of the
2014 applications brought by the Marshall Islands before the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) against the NWS for an alleged violation of this provision.3
2.2 What ‘Effective Measures’ Does Article VI Require?
Article VI requires all states parties to the NPT to pursue negotiations in good faith (1) on
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date, (2) on
effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament and (3) on a treaty on general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Contrary to what
has been argued by certain commentators4 and in spite of a sentence contained in the
preamble,5 the three obligations provided in Article VI are in no chronological or hierar-
chical order, apart from the fact that the negotiations on effective measures to cease the
nuclear arms race appear to be more urgent than the others, as they have to be undertaken
“at an early date.”
The normative character of the third obligation has been doubted by some,6 while
others have interpreted it narrowly as referring to general and complete nuclear disarma-
ment only.7 As to the first and second obligations, Article VI does not indicate what
“effective measures” need to be negotiated by the states parties. Not only bilateral and
multilateral treaties but also unilateral measures may be “effective measures” for the pur-
poses of the provision under consideration.8 On the other hand, it is doubtful that arms
control measures, i.e., measures merely aimed at reducing nuclear arsenals or limiting
their increase, are consistent with Article VI as the NWS have argued (with the possible
exception of China).9 Joyner, for instance, has maintained that, as the reference in the
provision is to “disarmament” and not to the narrower concept of arms control, partial
measures aimed at tackling vertical nuclear proliferation but not at completely eliminating
3 The Marshall Islands also filed a complaint on the same grounds against the United States and various US
organs before a US Federal District Court. So far, the ICJ has registered and listed on its website only the
cases against the states that have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ through declarations under
Art. 36(2) of the ICJ Statute (United Kingdom, India and Pakistan) but not those against the states which
are reliant on forum prorogatum for jurisdiction. The applications against the United Kingdom, India and
Pakistan can be read at <www.icj-cij.org>.
4 See C. Ford, ‘Debating Disarmament. Interpreting Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons’, The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 14, No. 3, November 2007, p. 404.
5 The Preamble refers to “the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their
delivery pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament” (emphasis added).
6 Nystuen & Graff Hugo 2014, p. 393.
7 Joyner 2014, p. 416.
8 Id., p. 411.
9 Id., pp. 400-401.
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the nuclear arsenals are incompatible with Article VI.10 Others, however, have taken the
opposite view.11 It appears, in my personal opinion, that arms control measures are consis-
tent with Article VI provided that they are the first step of a good faith process towards
the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. They would not be consistent with Article VI
if they were used by the NWS as a means to avoid or procrastinate indefinitely the final
achievement of that objective.
It should be recalled that, at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the NPT states parties
agreed on a series of 13 Practical Steps for the Implementation of Article VI.12 It has been
suggested that the NPT Review Conferences’ Final Documents may constitute “subsequent
agreement[s] between the parties” for interpretation purposes under Article 31(3) of the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.13 If this view is correct, whether or not
the NPT states parties have complied with Article VI could be tested against these steps,
which would identify the “effective measures” referred to in the provision. If so, the NWS
have not done much, if anything at all, to implement them. The United States, however,
has withdrawn its support for the 13 Steps.14
2.3 Is Article VI of the NPT a Pactum de Negotiando or a Pactum de
Contrahendo?
According to the ICJ’s 1996 advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Article VI entails not only an obligation to negotiate but also
an obligation to achieve a precise result – nuclear disarmament in all its aspects
– by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely, the pursuit of negotiations
on the matter in good faith.15
This conclusion, however, is difficult to reconcile with the ordinary meaning of the text,
which does not suggest an obligation to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion,
10 D.H. Joyner, International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 64.
11 See P.M. Kiernan, ‘“Disarmament” under the NPT: Article VI in the 21st Century’, Michigan State Interna-
tional Law Review, Vol. 20, 2012, p. 385.
12 2000 NPT Review Conference, Final Document, pp. 14-15, <www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/pdf/
finaldocs/2000%20-%20NY%20-%20NPT%20Review%20Conference%20-%20Final%20Document%20Parts%
20I%20and%20II.pdf>.
13 Joyner 2011, pp. 59-61.
14 Statement by J. Sherwood McGinniss, Deputy US Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, to the
Second Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, 1 May 2003, <www.us-
mission.ch/press2003/0501NPTMcGinnis.htm>.
15 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, 1996 ICJ Rep. 226, pp.
263-264, para. 99.
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for instance, by adopting a treaty on nuclear disarmament – a result that is beyond the
power of any individual state – but only “to pursue negotiations” in good faith. This is
confirmed by an interpretation that takes account of the context, in particular, of the
aspirational language of the preambular paragraph declaring the intention of the parties
“to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to
undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament.”16 Furthermore,
although “the distinction between [pactum de contrahendo and pactum de negotiando]
may be as narrow as to be nearly imperceptible,”17 a pactum de contrahendo needs to be
formulated “with sufficient precision” to create valid obligations and goes beyond an
“obligation assumed by two or more parties to negotiate in the future with a view to the
conclusion of a treaty.”18 Compare, for instance, the vague language of Article VI with the
far more specific text of Article III of the NPT, which provides for the obligation of the
NNWS to negotiate and conclude a safeguard agreement, having the characteristics spec-
ified therein, with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Finally, the travaux
préparatoires, used as supplementary means of interpretation, confirm that Article VI was
included in the final text of the Treaty exactly because it did not entail a commitment to
successfully conclude negotiations by adopting a treaty on nuclear disarmament.19
According to Mohamed Shaker, “[t]he obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith was
lukewarmly admitted by a number of States, as the only solution acceptable to the two
super-powers.”20
The fact that Article VI does not entail an obligation to achieve nuclear disarmament
does not mean that it has no normative value. Indeed, the provision contains, at the very
least, an obligation “to proactively, diligently, sincerely, and consistently pursue good faith
negotiations.”21 This goes further than an obligation to merely enter negotiations.22 In the
North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ held that the parties were
16 Emphasis added. See, however, Step No. 6 of the 13 Practical Steps to implement Art. VI agreed in the Final
Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, p. 14.
17 H. Owada, ‘Pactum de Contrahendo, Pactum de Negotiando’, in R. Wolfrum (Ed.), The Max Planck Encyclo-
pedia of Public International Law, Vol. VIII, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 19.
18 Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties, 2nd ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961, pp. 27, 29 (emphasis in the
original).
19 Joyner 2014, p. 399.
20 M. Shaker, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation 1959-1979, Vol. II, Oceana
Publications, London-New York, 1980, p. 572.
21 Joyner 2011, p. 99.
22 See Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland, Advisory Opinion of 15 October 1931, PCIJ (Ser. A/B)
No. 42, para. 29: “The Court is indeed justified in considering that the engagement incumbent on the two
Governments in conformity with the Council’s Resolution is not only to enter into negotiations, but also to
pursue them as far as possible, with a view to concluding agreements. […] But an obligation to negotiate
does not imply an obligation to reach an agreement.”
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under an obligation to enter into negotiations with a view to arriving at an
agreement, and […] so to conduct themselves that the negotiations are mean-
ingful, which will not be the case when either of them insists upon its own
position without contemplating any modification of it.23
In the case concerning Claims Arising out of Decisions of the Mixed Graeco/German
Arbitral Tribunal set up under Article 304 in Part X of the Treaty of Versailles, the Arbitral
Tribunal had already found that “an agreement to negotiate does not necessarily imply an
obligation to reach an agreement, [but] it does imply that serious efforts towards that end
will be made.”24 The Tribunal further specified that
[a] pactum de negotiando is […] not without legal consequences. It means that
both sides would make an effort, in good faith, to bring about a mutually satis-
factory solution by way of a compromise, even if that meant the relinquishment
of strongly held positions earlier taken. […] An undertaking to negotiate
involves an understanding to deal with the other side with a view to coming
to terms.25
The Lac Lanoux Arbitration confirms that a state will be in breach of an obligation to
negotiate when it is responsible for
an unjustified breaking off of the discussions, abnormal delays, disregard of
the agreed procedures, systematic refusals to take into consideration adverse
proposals or interests, and, more generally, in cases of violation of the rules of
good faith.26
It should be emphasized again that the fact that no agreement on general and complete
nuclear disarmament has so far been reached does not in itself demonstrate that the NPT
states parties have breached their obligation to negotiate in good faith. As the ICJ observed
in the Macedonia v. Greece case,
23 North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v. Denmark/The Netherlands), Merits, Judgment of 20 February 1969,
1969 ICJ Rep. 3, p. 48, para. 85 (emphasis added).
24 Case Concerning Claims Arising out of Decisions of the Mixed Graeco/German Arbitral Tribunal set up
under Article 304 in Part X of the Treaty of Versailles (Greece v. Federal Republic of Germany), Decision of
26 January 1972, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. XIX, p. 57.
25 Id., p. 56.
26 Lac Lanoux Arbitration of 16 November 1957 (France v. Spain), 24 ILR 128 (1957).
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[w]hether the obligation has been undertaken in good faith cannot be measured
by the result obtained. Rather, the Court must consider whether the Parties
conducted themselves in such a way that negotiations may be meaningful.27
Finally, as Judge Owada recalled in his Dissenting Opinion in the Whaling in the Antarctic
case, good faith on the part of a contracting state in performing its obligations under a
treaty “has necessarily to be presumed,”28 although the presumption is subject to rebuttal.
2.4 Does Article VI Reflect Customary International Law?
Customary international law is created by the convergence of two elements: practice by a
sufficiently representative number of states and other subjects of international law (for
instance, international organizations) and “evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it”29 (opinio iuris ac necessitatis).
Customary international law plays an important role in the Marshall Islands’ applications
before the ICJ, particularly in the cases against the NWS not parties to the NPT. Has
Article VI become binding on all states even beyond the NPT? In his Declaration attached
to the ICJ Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, President Bedjaoui stated that
it is not unreasonable to think that, considering the at least formal unanimity
in this field, this twofold obligation to negotiate in good faith and achieve the
desired result has now, 50 years on, acquired a customary character.30
With all due respect, it is difficult to agree with this view. The fact that a treaty has been
almost universally ratified or that the states parties act in conformity with the terms of the
treaty is not, on its own, sufficient evidence of its customary status. As stated in the Special
Rapporteur’s Second Report on the Identification of Customary International Law, one
has rather to look at the practice and opinio iuris of the states that are not parties to the
treaty and their attitude towards the treaty.31 The practice of states that have not ratified
the NPT (India, Pakistan and Israel) and of the state that has withdrawn from it (North
Korea) appears unsupportive of the customary nature of Article VI.
27 Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 (The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia v.
Greece), Merits, Judgment of 5 December 2011, 2011 ICJ Rep. 644, p. 685, para. 134.
28 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand Intervening), Merits, Judgment of 31 March 2014,
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Owada, p. 7, para. 21, <www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/148/18136.pdf>.
29 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, p. 45, para. 77.
30 Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, Declaration of President Bedjaoui, p. 274, para. 23 (emphasis in the
original).
31 Second Report on Identification of Customary International Law, by Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur, UN
Doc. A/CN.4/672, May 2014, pp. 43-44.
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From a methodological perspective, one cannot see how such custom could be consid-
ered as formed without taking into account the (rather inconsistent) practice and opinio
iuris of those states that possess nuclear weapons. The Special Rapporteur’s Second Report
on the Identification of Customary International Law explains that the practice of “States
whose interests are specially affected” “should weigh heavily (to the extent that, in appro-
priate circumstances, it may prevent a rule from emerging).”32 The specially affected states
for the purposes of custom formation are in primis those that have the opportunity to
engage in the relevant conduct.33 While it is true that Article VI formally addresses all NPT
states parties, this provision ‘specially’ affects only the NWS (at least with regard to the
part of Article VI that refers to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disar-
mament). Indeed, the NWS possess the weapons the elimination of which must be negoti-
ated, and it would make little sense for the NNWS to negotiate nuclear disarmament
without the participation of the NWS. The fact that Article VI consisted in what the NNWS
asked of the NWS – together with the reaffirmation of the inalienable right to the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy and the right to receive assistance in the exercise of that right, in
return for the NNWS’ renunciation to acquire nuclear weapons – demonstrates that this
provision was specifically aimed at the NWS.
To be truly ‘representative’, therefore, participation in the practice must necessarily
also include that of the NWS. In any case, the “formal unanimity” referred to by President
Bedjaoui is not as solid as it may seem at first sight. Indeed, the position of the several
NNWS that accept nuclear weapons on their territory and of those that benefit from the
nuclear deterrence umbrella cannot be reconciled with the alleged customary nature of
Article VI, as it is based on the acceptance that certain states may possess nuclear weapons.
The fact that Article VI does not reflect customary international law has been confirmed
in the ICJ’s Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, where the Court states that the obligation
“formally concerns the 182 states parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, or, in other words, the vast majority of the international community”: the vast
majority, but not the entire international community.
2.5 Conclusions
This chapter has argued that Article VI of the NPT only requires the states parties to pursue
good faith negotiations in order to adopt effective measures on the cessation of the nuclear
32 Second Report, p. 36.
33 The mechanical transplantation of concepts derived from the law of state responsibility, like ‘injured state’,
to custom formation should be avoided. It is also incorrect to argue that, because of the global effects of
nuclear explosions, the interests of all states are specially affected: indeed, Art. VI does not deal with the use
of nuclear weapons but with negotiations related to their possession.
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arms race and nuclear disarmament as well as a treaty on general and complete disarma-
ment. It does not obligate the parties to successfully conclude such negotiations by
achieving an agreement. In order to be meaningful, however, the negotiations must be
conducted in good faith with the aim of reaching this result. In this context, the upcoming
2015 NPT Review Conference will offer an important opportunity for the NWS to show
that they are committed to going in the right direction.
This chapter has also maintained that Article VI has not yet acquired customary status,
as there is no sufficiently widespread, consistent and representative practice and opinio
iuris in that sense. This of course does not exclude that the provision may become a cus-
tomary international law in the future, should the two elements of custom sediment.
There are of course many other problematic aspects of Article VI that, due to limited
space, were not examined here. If any of the abovementioned cases brought by the Marshall
Islands against the NWS for breach of Article VI reach the merits stage, however, the ICJ
will have an unprecedented opportunity to clarify all the issues arising from what is one
of the most controversial provisions of non-proliferation law.
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